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Kansas State University -University of Iowa Following a procedure derived from current practices of deconstruction, it would be plausible to begin this issue by entertaining the question of the preface, especially since Roland Barthes is known to have written so many of them in his career. Or perhaps it would be plausible to begin this preface with the question of the issue. If you have been reading Roland Barthes, you know that attempts to bring together the various stages of his evolution as writer and critic meet with frustration. Barthes has always advocated the need and the privilege of changing or turning intellectually...from one theoretical position to another or (in the words of Gregory Ulmer) from one tutor text to another. As a result, there is no global definition to account for this constant shift and its vertigo of paradox or issue sans issue. Stephen Heath is correct to argue that Barthes's writings are caught in a whirlpool or force of displacement which opposes the mapping out of a continuous transition. But Josue Harari is also correct when he claims that the Barthes of the 1970s cannot be understood without accounting for the Barthes who wrote the first sections of Writing Degree Zero in the wake of World War II. Ultimately, the global approach toward Barthes breaks into something closer to a double figure of relay between the breaks and gaps of difference on one side and the illusion of a single «life» or career on another.
Barthes has always professed a philosophy of pluralism in support of the discontinuous and fragmentary. The very thought of subsuming his writings into a biographic mold would therefore be offensive to him in its false integration of the subject. As Barthes's own desacralization of literature is not only apparent in the theoretical eclecticism to which we have already alluded, but also in his subject matter. Since the early seventies, Barthes's writing has responded to a variety of stimuli, ranging from a text of Goethe to a travel episode (see the article by Lynn Higgins), three gardens outside a house in Bayonne (in the article by Frances Bartkowski), the photograph of his mother in a winter garden, and many more. To these unrelated experiences, Barthes has given the name «biographemes»-a sort of artificially created fetish attached onto a love-object. As early as in 1971 in Sade, Fourier, Loyola, Barthes applies the technique of the biographeme to such diverse objects as Sade's white muff, Fourier's flowerpots, and Ignatius's Spanish eyes. The result has been a progressive breaking away from the continuity of traditional narrative in favor of a condensed and fragmentary style of writing. Roland Barthes provides a lengthy discussion of fragments which opposes their force to their signification, emphasizing the self-reflexivity and jouissance which subtend them. Fragments, he adds, are characterized by their separation from one another-forming a sort of encyclopedia-but also by their inner gaps and lacunae which amount to more than instances of asyndeta and anacolutha. As a result, any order imposed on them is arbitrary. Alphabetical? Chronological? By what affinities-elective or selective-should the fragments be linked? Barthes concludes that order distorts reality. He imagines an antistructural criticism which would not look for the work's order but its disorder. Obviously, we have come a long way from the historically grounded concept of the literary masterpiece whose raison d'être rested on a class-conscious society.
Barthes never did write the true novel he said he hoped to write,. As late as 1977, during a colloquium at Cerisy-la-Salle, he seemed to be struggling with something of a paradox. On the one hand he indicated that his urge to paint those whom he loved could best be satisfied by writing a novel. On the other hand, he feared that a tedious imitation of narrative codes would abolish the love permeating the figural style of the fragments he hoped to write. What attracted Barthes to a fragmentary writing, in addition to its obvious anti-structuralist advantage, is that it multiplies the sur-faces of contact and pleasure: «Liking to find, to write beginnings, he tends to multiply this pleasure: that is why he writes fragments: so many fragments, so many beginnings, so many pleasures.» (RB, p. 94) Thus the inscription of affect finds its perfect form in the fragment.
The multiplication of incipits relating to the experience of jouissance (or punctum in La Chambre claire) has yet another, even greater function. It can unveil what Lacan calls the Real (not to be confused with reality): the foreclosed element of the unconscious often approached but seldom grasped. Jouissance and fragmentary writing promote moments of self-knowledge by implicating the (writing) subject within the text, a concern with utterance which had been displaced during the heroic period of structuralism. Indeed, Barthes's recent practice of writing focuses on the unspeakable (the in-dicible) self-knowledge, that residue of all articulation, customarily foreclosed in Symbolic activities. To be sure, the knowledge sought by Barthes's materialist subject is not sanctioned by academic orthodoxy since it takes form in a figural style featuring both seeing (in the preface to Erre), and loving (in A Lover's Discourse). To the questions raised at the beginning of this preface-«what to do with Barthes?»-we can respond that the best and most pleasurable thing to do is to prolong his discourse as the contributors of this issue have done.
A year after the death of Barthes, the suitable way to write on, in, or with his writings is via the double figure traced by the slash of letter Z: a split or break within which we would locate the polygraphies to follow. Within these writings, we propose two approaches and a number of variations on the personal and the critical. In the Letters to Milena, Kafka writes of a Chinese book in which a man on the point of death reflects on what is about to occur, comparing his thoughts to an extended song which can never equal its object. A student chides him for talking so much about death without ever getting around to dying. (Would Lacan call this a «passage toward the act»?) The man replies that he will inevitably die and that the difference between meditation and act is only that of a few words. 
